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It was roughly five years ago, in a late sum-
mer gathering of investors and thought 
leaders, that the term “impact investing” was 
coined. The practice, of course, is more than 
five years old. Omidyar Network, for example, 
had been investing for both social and finan-
cial returns since 2004. 
In the past five years we’ve seen an exponen-
tial growth of interest in our industry, much 
of it focused on individual firms. Most impact 
investors see their primary goal as finding 
and investing in enterprises that yield strong 
financial and social returns—a goal we share 
and support. But we worry this singular focus 
may miss the forest for the trees. 
In this discussion paper, we argue for a shift 
in focus—toward the goal of scaling entire in-
dustry sectors, in addition to individual firms. 
Our experience from the past eight years is 
that impact investors can massively increase 
the number of lives they touch by concentrat-
ing investments in specific industry sectors 
in specific geographies, and by investing in 
a range of organizations to accelerate the 
development of these industry segments. The 
need for investment is particularly acute at 
the earliest stages of innovation, which pro-
vide the foundation in which entire new sec-
tors can emerge and scale rapidly by tapping 
commercial capital markets.
Creating and scaling entire sectors can make 
the difference, for example, between support-
ing one solar lantern company that can pro-
vide safe lights to thousands of children who 
otherwise can’t study for school at night—and 
accelerating an entire solar lantern industry 
that could provide these lanterns to millions, 
if not hundreds of millions of students.  
Tools for the Journey
Easier said than done, you may rightly be 
thinking. After all, many industry sectors, es-
pecially those serving disadvantaged popula-
tions and with weak infrastructures, can take 
decades to develop. Microfinance, one of the 
most heralded innovations for the poor, first 
emerged in the 1970s and, despite strong 
growth, is still available to only a minority of 
the world’s poor.   
But consider this. Accelerating the develop-
ment of the microfinance sector by just three 
or four years means extending critical finan-
cial services to tens of millions of people—
well above the scale than any single firm can 
reach.  
The nascent medical technology sector serv-
ing the base of the pyramid in India offers 
another example of the potential of mar-
ket acceleration. According to a 2011 study 
by McKinsey & Company, accelerating the 
growth trajectory of the affordable medical 
technology sector in India by just three to 
four years could mean that poorer consumers 
Sectors, Not Just Firms
I.
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have access to an additional two billion  
medical treatments per year by 2015. For 
some of those customers, having access to 
such treatments could mean the difference 
between life and death. 
In this paper we offer several ideas on how 
to spark, nurture, and scale new sectors for 
social change. In Section II, for example, we 
lay out three specific types of organizations 
that together help build an industry sector—
innovators, scalers, and infrastructure players 
Each of these organizational types has very 
different risk and return profiles, but they all 
need to be adequately capitalized in order to 
speed up the development of any given  
sector.   
The paucity of financial and human capital 
available for high-risk, early-stage ventures 
(what we call “innovators”) and for sector-
specific industry infrastructure poses a mas-
sive impediment to the healthy growth of 
the impact investing sector. Everyone loves 
to invest in the occasional impact investing 
“homerun” that promises strong financial and 
social returns—and these homeruns have an 
important demonstration effect for the viabil-
ity of the industry as a whole. Unfortunately, 
relatively few appear willing to step up to 
the hard and uncertain work of sparking and 
nurturing the innovations that ultimately gen-
erate a robust flow of investable, high-return 
impact investments. It is as if impact inves-
tors are lined up around the proverbial water 
pump waiting for the flood of deals, while no 
one is actually priming the pump!
An excessive focus on the individual firm, we 
believe, also has caused many impact inves-
tors to underestimate the importance of pol-
icy and political sensitivity, particularly when 
serving the disadvantaged. In Section IV , we 
detail how three policy levers—promoting 
competition, ensuring consumer protection, 
and promoting entrepreneurship—can speed 
up or delay the development of industry 
sectors, often by decades. We also note how 
a lack of appreciation of political dynamics 
can cause firms, and entire sectors, to suffer 
serious setbacks. Oddly, despite the dramatic 
fallout of microfinance in the Indian state of 
Andhra Pradesh, there seems to be relatively 
little discussion of the extent to which profit-
making firms serving the disadvantaged are 
particularly vulnerable to backlash from a 
wide array of players, including concerned 
politicians, a skeptical press and citizenry and 
entrenched economic interests. 
Our Own Evolution
Pierre and Pam Omidyar established Omidyar 
Network with a uniquely flexible structure—
enabling us to deploy whatever type of capi-
tal, whether grants or for-profit investments, 
we thought could best help solve a problem. 
Pierre believes that for-profit firms might 
have advantages in achieving rapid scale that 
are unavailable to many non-profits—such 
as access to commercial financing and the 
ability to reinvest profit to sustain growth. To 
date, Omidyar Network has invested more 
than a half a billion dollars in typically early-
stage social impact organizations, almost 
equally split between for profit and not-for-
profit investments. Many of the observations 
and insights in this series come from our own 
explorations about how best to take advan-
tage of our flexible structure.
As we were refining our approach to driv-
ing sector-level change, we noticed lots of 
new investors piling into the impact investing 
arena, many with the expectation of finding a 
steady stream of relatively mature businesses 
offering both social impact and risk-adjusted 
returns. We have found a real shortage of 
such deals. 
Concern over inadequate deal flow was one 
of several factors that led us to reevaluate our 
We realized that if we truly  
cared most about sector creation, 
then we needed to develop a way  
to account for the total value  
creation of the firm, including  
sector value creation as well as  
the firm’s social impact and  
financial returns. 
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own approach to what we referred to as the 
“gray space” between grants and risk-adjust-
ed return investment. Historically, we were al-
ways comfortable with traditional grant mak-
ing, where we expected one hundred percent 
loss of principal. But when we did for-profit 
investments, we insisted on deals that would 
yield risk-adjusted commercial rates of return. 
This was driven by concerns about distort-
ing markets and the desire to be as rigorous 
as possible in our investments. With time, we 
realized that this insistence on risk-adjusted 
returns would cause us—and the impact in-
vesting industry as a whole—to systematically 
under-invest in creating the conditions under 
which innovations—and entire new sectors—
could be sparked and scaled. 
Since 2007, we have invested in businesses 
that we did not expect to earn risk adjust 
returns, but which we DID expect would help 
advance entire sectors. For example, in 2008, 
we invested in MFX, a company that helps 
microfinance institutions decrease the for-
eign exchange risks of borrowing money in 
western currencies and lending out in local 
currencies. MFX is a for-profit company, but 
we knew we might not achieve risk-adjusted 
returns on our investment, and discussed this 
question in great detail. We decided to move 
forward, because we were clear that MFX 
would make a large contribution to accelerat-
ing the microfinance sector as a whole. 
We realized that if we truly cared most about 
sector creation, then we needed to develop 
a way to account for the total value creation 
of the firm, including sector value creation 
as well as the firm’s direct social impact 
and financial returns. This led us to refine 
the process by which we consider invest-
ments across the entire returns continuum, 
from grants to risk-adjusted returns—and 
particularly those that fall in the middle of 
the spectrum. While this has required much 
greater discipline around identifying sector-
level value creation, we also think it has given 
us new tools for priming the pump for sector-
level change.  
The observations, insights, and changes 
that we will highlight in this paper were, for 
us, neither immediately obvious nor easy to 
adapt. The appropriate role of below mar-
ket returns, for example, continues to be the 
source of considerable debate within ON and 
across the sector. More broadly, the impact 
investing sector remains in its infancy and we 
are just beginning to examine critical ques-
tions, such as how to create entire new mar-
kets for social change. Our insights will grow 
and deepen in the years to come. 
Though we are eight years into our journey, 
we are still on a steep learning curve. Our 
intent with this series is NOT to try to present 
the definitive blueprint on how to spark, nur-
ture, and scale entire new sectors for social 
change. We are committed, rather, to contrib-
uting our experiences and thoughts to the 
ongoing dialogue that is shaping the incred-
ibly promising impact investing sector. We 
invite you to participate in this dialogue with 
us, to push back, to help us refine our own 
thinking. Even more importantly, we invite 
you to collaborate with us on this challenging 
but critically and inspiring journey. To truly 
scale sectors in impact investing, we will need 
all hands on deck.
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Embracing the Full  
Investment Continuum
II.
In the previous section, we argued that the 
impact investing sector should focus more 
on what is required to spark, nurture, and 
scale entire sectors for social change. Though 
investing in firms is an essential component 
to driving sector-level change, it is ultimately 
sector development that matters the most. 
As Alvaro Rodriguez of the impact investing 
fund Ignia has written, “Single firms are born, 
they mature, they get lazy and they die. But 
industries prosper over time and reach scale 
as competition fosters the delivery of better 
products at lower cost.”  
We also described Omidyar Network’s evolu-
tion toward greater willingness to experiment 
with all the tools necessary to drive sector-
level change. One of the things that ON has 
realized is that we invest differently when we 
consider a firm’s sector impact. If we do NOT 
consider sector-level impact, we are likely to 
under-invest in organizations—particularly 
early-stage, high-risk innovative firms—that 
have the potential to create a new industry 
sector or fundamentally transform industry 
sector dynamics.  
Three key insights emerged from our explora-
tion of this topic: 
1.  Social impact needs to be  
 measured at the SECTOR as  
 well as the firm level
The impacting investing community has made 
significant strides at developing tools for as-
sessing the social impact of individual firms. 
Efforts such as GIIRS and IRIS give impact in-
vestors a taxonomy to benchmark how firm-
level outputs contribute to social change. For 
example, if you’re a health care provider, we 
could record the number of patients treated 
and what the outcomes were and then com-
pare those results to others in the field. 
Absent from these measurements, however, 
are the positive externalities your firm may 
create for the sector as a whole. For example, 
your company may be the first entrant in a 
market where regulatory structures are weak, 
management talent scarce, and custom-
ers are highly suspicious of the efficacy and 
safety of your offering. While you may not be 
able to reach of millions of people on your 
own, your own trial-and-error efforts may 
develop a new model that lowers the risk and 
makes possible the entry of later health care 
providers that in turn can touch tens of mil-
lions of lives. 
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In essence, we are arguing that:  
2. Three Categories of Actors
Our analysis suggests that firms/organiza-
tions can be broken into at least three distinct 
categories according to their impact in grow-
ing an industry sector. It’s important to note 
that the generalizations below are derived 
from our experiences serving markets with 
disadvantaged or poorer customers; they do 
not always apply to higher income market 
segments. We would also emphasize that this 
typology is meant to apply to the develop-
ment of for-profit markets for social impact, 
not necessarily for social impact sectors that 
are covered primarily through grant-making. 
This insight stems from the work of pioneer-
ing impact investors, such as the Ignia fund, 
which has recognized that some firms in its 
portfolio are facing both sector and business 
risk and that each type of risk creates differ-
ent challenges and necessitates a different 
investment approach and set of expectations.
Total Social Impact 
of a Firm
Direct Impact 
of the Firm
Sector Level Impact 
of the Firm= +
NON-PROFIT FOR PROFIT
Investment Continuum:
Expected Returns
Non-revenue 
generating
Higher revenue 
generating
Below market 
returns
Market returns 
recognized by 
select investors
Market returns 
commonly 
recognized
Market Scalers
Market Innovators
Market Infrastructure
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Market Innovators
These are the trailblazing entrepreneurs and 
teams that believe in a product or service well 
before its profit potential is obvious to most 
established investors. They contribute mean-
ingfully to advancing a sector by de-risking 
the generic model of an innovation or prod-
uct. Some sector innovators, though not all, 
will also be able to scale up on their own as 
individual firms. 
Example: 
Bridge International Academies is pioneer-
ing low-cost, high quality education for poor 
schoolchildren in Kenya, using a “school in a 
box”’ model that standardizes innovations in 
service delivery for easy replication. Because 
this was the first of its kind, and sector risk 
was high, many of Bridge’s early investors 
were motivated more by philanthropic intent 
and did not expect market rates of return. 
After several years, Bridge has managed to 
de-risk the model considerably, scaling to 
82 schools—significantly increasing its own 
valuation and attracting more mainstream 
investors. More importantly, Bridge has now 
defined a model that can be replicated by 
others. Indeed, this may be Bridge’s biggest 
contribution, just as Grameen and BRAC’s 
biggest contribution to microfinance was the 
model itself.
Returns expectations: 
Market innovators exist across the returns 
continuum—from revenue-generating non-
profits, such as microfinance pioneers in the 
1970s, to firms such as Bridge Academies In-
ternational, which has the chance to generate 
market rates of returns. In general, however, 
market innovators are the “high beta” invest-
ments of the impact investing world; returns 
are highly uncertain. In our view, this is where 
there is the biggest need for socially motivat-
ed impact investors to take appropriate risks 
and to invest in the human as well as financial 
capital required to help ambitious entrepre-
neurs refine and scale up their world-chang-
ing ideas. A long-term view is also essential, 
as innovators can take many years to become 
commercially viable. Monitor research, for 
example, suggests that most businesses serv-
ing millions of poor customers in India took at 
least 15 years to reach scale. 
  
Open issues: 
We need better ways to measure and pre-
dict meaningful contributions to de-risking a 
sector, so as to ensure disciplined investing. 
Extreme caution is also necessary to minimize 
the likelihood that a subsidy might inadver-
tently distort and slow market development. 
Finally, we would note that there is a short-
age of impact investors who are willing to 
dedicate the considerable time, energy, and 
cost required to nurture early-stage, high-risk 
market innovators. More on all these issues 
later in the series. 
Market Scalers
Market scalers enter a sector after a generic 
model has been de-risked. They accelerate 
the growth of a sector by scaling as individual 
firms. They may also tend to refine and en-
hance the generic model. 
Example: 
Grameen Bank took 15 years to reach its first 
million customers with its pioneering model 
of microfinance, while Indian microfinance 
firm Equitas (which entered the market in 
2007, nearly 30 years after Grameen) scaled 
from zero to one million plus customers (and 
from one to 40 million dollars in revenue), 
in less than five years. The most successful 
market scalers are able to expand rapidly 
by tapping commercial capital markets; in 
the process, they are able to extend access 
to needed goods and services to millions in 
need.
“Single firms are born, they 
mature, they get lazy and they 
die. But industries prosper 
over time and reach scale as 
competition fosters the  
delivery of better products at 
lower cost.”  
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Returns expectations: 
Market scalers are more likely than market 
innovators to achieve risk-adjusted market 
rates of return. Indeed, it is critical that many 
market scalers DO earn risk-adjusted returns, 
as this is the most viable means of raising 
enough capital to scale up to serve millions. 
It is important to note that given the high-risk 
environment in which many market scalers 
operate, they may sometimes still be per-
ceived by mainstream investors as too risky. 
Impact investors with local and/or deep sec-
tor knowledge are more likely to understand 
the returns potential. 
Open issues: 
If financially successful, market scalers (and 
indeed highly profitable market innovators as 
well) are likely to raise concerns about mis-
sion drift and “appropriate” levels of profit-
ability—as evident in the intense debate on 
the role of commercial microfinance. Suc-
cessful enterprises serving disadvantaged 
populations also face tricky political issues, as 
their very success may threaten entrenched 
economic interests or raise concerns among 
politicians who view themselves as advocates 
for the poor and may be uncomfortable with 
private sector approaches to social problems. 
More on this, too, in a later section. 
Market Infrastructure
Industry players often have common needs 
that are most economically served in collec-
tive form. Infrastructure players advance a 
sector by addressing these collective needs, 
thus helping to build a supportive ecosystem 
for entrepreneurial innovation.
Example: 
Many different categories of infrastructure 
exist, from industry associations (e.g., GSMA’s 
Development Fund, which works to increase 
access to mobile financial services to the 
poor, among other goals) to information ex-
changes (e.g., the MIX, which provides finan-
cial data and social performance metrics for 
microfinance).  
Financial returns expectations: 
Often, though not always, market infrastruc-
ture organizations can find ways to derive 
revenue from the services they provide, and 
sometimes even can cross the threshold 
toward profitability; however, they are rarely 
hugely profitable.  
Open issues: 
Market infrastructure organizations should 
strike the right balance in pursuing revenue 
streams for sustainability and growth. While 
charging for services allows organizations to 
test their value proposition, not all forms of 
industry leadership can be easily monetized, 
especially in the earliest stages of a sector. 
If they are to be sustained, therefore, these 
infrastructure organizations need to be able 
to demonstrate their value—either to paying 
members or grant-making organizations. We 
would also note that LACK of infrastructure 
can disrupt an otherwise burgeoning sector, 
and that many times the infrastructure needs 
to be developed at a national level. The lack 
of a credit bureau serving Indian microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), for example, contributed 
to the over-indebtedness problem that was 
a significant contributor to the microfinance 
crisis in the state of Andhra Pradesh. 
A sector-level view is relevant 
far beyond microfinance. We see 
strong potential for other sec-
tors to accelerate as well—from 
low-cost education for the poor 
in emerging economies (being 
pioneered by Bridge Academies, 
among others), to mobile pay-
ments platforms (such as those 
enabled by M-PESA). 
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3. Investments in all of these  
 different vehicles and returns  
 profiles are necessary to move  
 a sector  
It’s commonly known, for example, that most 
early MFIs started out as grant-funded NGOs. 
After early-stage innovators demonstrated 
the generic model to be commercially viable 
in the late 1990s, sector growth was driven 
largely by scalers, many of whom were able 
to tap commercial capital markets. These for-
profit firms (many of which converted from 
not-for-profits), brought financial services to 
additional tens of millions of previously ex-
cluded people. All along the way, infrastruc-
ture organizations such as the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the MIX 
played a key role in enabling this scale. 
Omidyar Network contributed to the growth 
of microfinance by investing more than $100 
million across 28 organizations, 15 not-for-
profits, and 13 for-profits. Roughly two thirds 
of our funding went to organizations helping 
to provide financial services for the un-
banked; the other third went to infrastructure 
groups, such as MFX (a currency hedging 
facility for MFIs) and the IFC’s global credit 
bureau program. 
A sector-level view is relevant far beyond mi-
crofinance. We see strong potential for other 
sectors to accelerate as well—from low-cost 
education for the poor in emerging econo-
mies (being pioneered by Bridge Academies, 
among others), to mobile payments platforms 
(such as those enabled by M-PESA). We 
believe that to scale up, such sectors need to 
ultimately produce the “win-win” (high social 
return, high financial return) investments that 
will enable them to tap the commercial capi-
tal markets.
But before we can tap capital markets to en-
able sector lift off, it will take high-risk toler-
ance, hard work, and persistence to identify, 
fund, and support the best market innovators 
and infrastructure organizations required to 
kick-start the process of sector development. 
More on this in the next section . 
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Gaps in the Impact  
Investing Capital Curve
III.
In Section II, we described three distinct 
types of organizations—innovators, scalers, 
and infrastructure players—which together 
can spark, nurture, and scale entire sectors 
for social change. 
But capital is not evenly available for all these 
types of organizations. Not surprisingly, most 
impact investing capital appears to be avail-
able primarily to scalers—firms operating in 
sectors that have already been substantially 
de-risked and which offer the prospect of 
strong financial and social returns. By con-
trast, innovators and industry-specific infra-
structure firms often struggle to raise nec-
essary funds and to get the human capital 
support often so critical to success. Indeed, 
capital appears to be thinnest precisely 
where it is needed the most: to prime the 
pump of innovation and deal flow.
The Innovator’s Deficit 
The biggest funding gap, by a wide mar-
gin we believe, is for early-stage innovators. 
There are very few impact-oriented investors 
willing to assume the high risks and uncertain 
and/or low returns associated with investing 
behind socially impactful early-stage busi-
nesses, particularly in geographies and indus-
tries where sector risk is perceived to be high. 
This deficit was described extensively and 
compellingly in the Monitor Group’s recent 
report, “From Blueprint to Scale: The Case for 
Philanthropy in Impact Investing.” 
In 2010, JP Morgan and the Global Impact 
Investing Network estimated that the impact 
investments in the developing world would 
grow to between $400 billion to $1 trillion 
dollars worth of capital deployed within the 
decade. Although good data is hard to come 
by, it appears that the percentage of this 
capital flowing to early-stage investments in 
companies serving disadvantaged popula-
tions is quite modest —probably ranging in 
the low hundreds of millions of dollars glob-
ally per year. These estimates are based on 
activity levels of a handful of leading players 
doing early stage impact deals in the devel-
oping world. 
For example, Acumen Fund, one of the pio-
neering investors in impact investing for the 
base of pyramid has committed roughly $73 
million in investments over 10 years. Gray 
Ghost, another early-stage industry pioneer 
investing in low income communities, has 
committed a similar amount of capital—$100 
million since 2003. Other leading BOP inves-
tors boast similar ballpark figures, for ex-
ample Elevar ($94 million since 2006), Ignia 
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($48 million since 2007), and Aavishkar ($53 
million since 2007). Of the $550 million of 
capital that Omidyar Network has deployed 
since 2004, more than $250 million has gone 
to early stage BOP investing, about a third of 
which went to grants. 
Early stage investing requires not only a keen 
understanding of the market and excellent 
business judgment; it also requires a commit-
ment to identifying top entrepreneurs and 
helping them scale up their capabilities and 
their team. It is quite common for the costs 
of these human capital efforts to exceed the 
size of the financial commitments, particu-
larly given the small dollar amounts invested 
in early stage innovators.  
Omidyar Network’s average deal size for early 
stage deals in the developing world is about 
one to two million dollars. This is a modest 
size for a developed world venture capital 
investment, but a large amount of capital for 
an early stage firm in places such as India. 
Indeed, recent research by the World Bank, 
for example, suggests the gap in early stage 
funding for the BOP in countries like India is 
not just at the typical venture capital range, 
but at the angel and seed stage (tens to hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars per deal instead 
of a million dollars or more). Of course, even 
decent financial returns on investments of 
this size would be quickly swallowed up by 
transaction and human capital costs. Thus, we 
ourselves often struggle with the challenges 
of going even earlier stage with our invest-
ments. 
The reality, of course, is that if we wish to 
build an impact investing industry that suc-
cessfully delivers on the promise of bringing 
market-based solutions to disadvantaged 
populations, our success depends on our sup-
port for these early stage innovators. It is to-
day’s fledgling innovator who sets the stage 
for tomorrow’s next great scalable innovation 
that can also produce strong financial returns. 
 
The Infrastructure Gap
It is encouraging to see infrastructure for the 
impact investing sector being built at the 
global level. Organizations such as the Global 
Impact Investing Network, the Aspen Net-
work of Development Entrepreneurs, and the 
European Venture Philanthropy Network play 
key leadership roles in stewarding the im-
pact investing industry at global and regional 
levels. The emergence of promising new 
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial ventures, 
however, is also dependent upon a robust 
industry-specific infrastructure built at the 
national (and sometimes state) level. 
For example, the previously mentioned 2011 
McKinsey research on the medical technology 
sector in India, identified a host of infrastruc-
ture and ecosystem interventions that could 
collectively help increase the availability of 
medical services to the poor by millions of 
treatments per year. Such interventions in-
cluded training institutions for medical device 
technicians, efforts to establish a national 
regulatory regime for medical devices, and 
the establishment of a center for excellence in 
social marketing for medical devices.  
Many of these needs could be met by non-
profit and low-profit organizations. Unfor-
tunately, ready sources of funding for such 
efforts are hard to come by from impact and 
commercial investors who prioritize financial 
returns and/or measure their success on the 
basis of individual firm-level outputs rather 
than the development of industry sectors as 
a whole.  
Innovators and industry-specific 
infrastructure firms often struggle 
to raise necessary funds and to get 
the human capital support often so 
critical to success. Indeed, capital 
appears to be thinnest precisely 
where it is needed the most: to 
prime the pump of innovation and 
deal flow.
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Where’s the Money?
So, if there are yawning gaps in the capital 
curve for both innovators and infrastructure, 
then where is the capital likely to come from?
Commercial Investors
The largest source of potential capital is in 
commercial capital markets, which represent 
trillions of dollars of investable assets. Com-
mercial markets work quite well in allocating 
capital to businesses that the market believes 
will yield risk- adjusted financial returns. So-
called “returns first” impact investors—those 
impact investors who prioritize returns above 
social impact—appear to many to be a sub-
set of the commercial capital market. In most 
cases, commercial funds—whether they are 
impact investing funds or not—are tapped 
in later stages of market development, after 
specific innovations and business models 
are de-risked. Large scale commercial funds 
did not flow into microfinance, for example, 
until several decades after the generic mi-
crofinance model had been pioneered with 
the support of multilaterals and philanthropy. 
Commercial capital is thus of exceptional 
importance in the later stages of scaling up 
impact investing industry sectors (and it re-
cently did this for microfinance); it is unlikely, 
however, to fill the gap in funding needed in 
for innovators and infrastructure. 
Established Foundations
US foundations alone deploy about $47 
billion per year (and sit on total assets of 
more than one about $650 dollars). They are 
another major potential source of funding for 
the innovation cycle in impact investing. In-
deed, many foundations have active Program 
Related Investment (PRI) initiatives, enabling 
them to invest in for-profit organizations 
delivering a positive social impact. How-
ever, notwithstanding the pioneering efforts 
of foundations such as Gates, Rockefeller, 
Hewlett, and Skoll, PRIs still represented only 
one percent of capital deployed by founda-
tions in 2009. Moreover, most of this capital 
went to relatively low-risk debt instruments. 
Only five one hundredths of one percent of 
US foundation capital deployed went to eq-
uity PRIs, which represents the type of capital 
necessary to help fund innovators. 
Substantially increasing direct foundation 
investments in “innovators” would also re-
quire a dramatic mindset shift—from seeing 
philanthropy’s primary role as addressing 
market failures to also embracing its potential 
to catalyze markets. Tapping foundation en-
dowments, meanwhile, would require similarly 
fundamental shifts in endowment objectives 
and strategy. Given these obstacles, we think 
it is unlikely that foundations will dramati-
cally increase their direct investments in early 
stage ventures. It is possible, of course, for 
foundations to provide funding to early stage 
impact investing funds, as Rockefeller did 
with Acumen. There is also great potential for 
foundations to provide funds for infrastruc-
ture and ecosystem work in industry sectors 
with strong social impact.   
Already, existing initiatives such as the AGRA 
Alliance for Agriculture in Africa (supported 
by government and development institutions 
as well as foundations) and pioneering drug 
discovery for developing world diseases hold 
great promise in creating more opportunities 
for private sector innovators by increasing 
innovation and reducing risk. Large-scale, 
broad-based initiatives could be supplement-
ed by more targeted short-term grants that 
benefit specific emergent business sectors 
and even firms. 
Development Institutions and Banks 
Development institutions and banks could be 
excellent sources of funding for innovators 
in impact investing, particularly in emerging 
economies. They deploy billions of dollars 
every year with the explicit goal of combat-
ing poverty and contributing to economic 
growth in poor countries. However, incentive 
structures within these institutions are some-
times an obstacle. Employees of develop-
ment banks are often rewarded for volume 
of capital deployed, which makes it difficult 
to support smaller, early-stage deals. And 
aid institutions often are not encouraged to 
take on high-risk equity investments. Indeed, 
development banks frequently need to justify 
their continued funding by demonstrating 
solid returns, making it relatively unattractive 
to pursue high-risk, early-stage investments.
Despite these incentive structures, however, 
we see a number of hopeful examples of 
development banks and agencies taking on 
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higher-risk, earlier-stage profiles. Programs 
like USAID’s development innovation ven-
tures, the World Bank’s development market-
place, and the IDB’s Multilateral Investment 
Fund (MIF), and Opportunity for the Majority 
Initiative are steps in the right direction. We 
are also encouraged to see institutions such 
as the International Finance Corporation, 
the UK Department for International Devel-
opment (in cooperation with CDC) and the 
Dutch development bank, FMO, take advan-
tage of their equity windows to increase their 
involvement in early-stage investment. Devel-
opment institutions and banks could also play 
a pivotal role in supporting the development 
of industry-specific infrastructure. 
High Net Worth Individuals
We see the increased involvement of high 
net worth individuals in impact investing as 
potentially catalytic to the sector. Individuals 
such as Pierre Omidyar, Vinod Khosla, Steve 
Case, Jeff Skoll, Sir Ronald Cohen, and others 
have deep entrepreneurial backgrounds. They 
not only embrace innovation and have a high 
risk tolerance; they are also quite willing to 
experiment with market-based and for-profit 
approaches to achieving social impact
We believe that individuals with similar ap-
proaches could have a transformative effect 
on the impact investing industry by investing 
in early-stage, high-growth ventures, and by 
funding industry-specific infrastructure to 
support these. We are eager to find creative 
ways to expand and support such efforts. 
Directing Capital to the Right Places
One of the great successes of the impact in-
vesting movement is that it has drawn atten-
tion to the fact that businesses can generate 
The reality, of course, is that if we 
wish to build an impact investing 
industry that successfully delivers 
on the promise of bringing mar-
ket-based solutions to disadvan-
taged populations, our success 
depends on our support for these 
early stage innovators. It is today’s 
fledgling innovator who sets the 
stage for tomorrow’s next great 
scalable innovation that can also 
produce strong financial returns. 
tremendous social impact as well as financial 
return. There is ample capital out there; the 
key is tapping into appropriate sources for 
appropriate needs.  
In so doing, investors will need to grapple 
with the complex and controversial topic of 
subsidy. Under what circumstances should 
investors consider using grant funds or con-
cessional debt or equity in support of impact 
investing work? We turn to this topic in the 
next section. 
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“First, Do No Harm”  
The Use of Subsidies in  
Impact Investing
IV.
In Section III, we highlighted the biggest gaps 
in capital supply for impact investing. While 
money is flowing reasonably well to “scalers,” 
where investors expect high financial and 
social returns, money is less readily available 
for industry infrastructure and for early-stage 
innovators—especially in markets that serve 
the most disadvantaged.
One of the critical and contentious questions 
that impact investors often face—especially 
when investing in early-stage innovators—is 
about the role of subsidy. When, and in what 
circumstances, is subsidy appropriate? 
Investing in the Gray Space
Certain forms of subsidies are more contro-
versial than others. It appears widely ac-
cepted, for example, that grant capital can 
and should be used to build industry infra-
structure. Governments and foundations alike, 
for example, have regularly funded basic 
research in diverse fields such as agriculture 
and medicine. 
What’s less clear is when and how financial 
subsidies—whether in the forms of grants or 
concessional debt or equity—should be given 
directly to for-profit innovators and scalers. 
The April 2012 Monitor report, “From Blue-
print to Scale: The Case for Philanthropy in 
Impact Investing” describes the practice of 
giving grants to for-profit organizations as a 
classic approach for building the pipeline of 
inclusive businesses in challenging markets. 
We applaud the exhortation to invest earlier 
in the innovation lifecycle. But we believe it is 
also important to conduct a thorough exami-
nation of the risks and benefits of subsidy in 
these situations. We would also point out that 
the appropriateness of subsidy is strongly 
influenced by the nature of the market be-
ing served: subsidies may be necessary to 
kick-start firms serving the very base of the 
economic pyramid, but are less essential—and 
potentially harmful—when directed at firms 
serving those with significant disposable 
income.
Finally, it’s extremely important to note that 
subsidy is not the only way to kick-start for-
profit sector development, even for lower-
income consumers. At Omidyar Network, our 
focus on developing deep sector and geo-
graphic expertise frequently leads us to price 
risk differently than generalist or geographi-
cally remote investors. A high percentage of 
our investments are in businesses that we be-
lieve—against conventional wisdom—have the 
potential to generate strong financial returns. 
Such willingness to question more conserva-
tive perceptions of risk is a major way that 
impact investors can accelerate the growth 
of new industry sectors. And in many cases, 
this approach can give impact investors a 
competitive advantage in finding promising 
profitable new business models that don’t 
necessarily require subsidy. 
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The Risks of Firm Subsidy
Many strong market advocates cite the fol-
lowing potential risks of investing in a lower-
returns business, whether with grants or with 
concessional for-profit capital:
1. Preventing a Level-Playing Field  
 for Competition:
In well-functioning markets, return-seeking 
capital will flow to the firm that develops the 
best value proposition and business model 
for its target market. This tends to ensure that 
the firms that serve their customers best will 
be the ones that grow. If one provides subsi-
dized capital or grant capital to one for-profit 
entity, but not all of its potential competitors, 
then one risks undermining the discipline of 
the market, thereby destroying rather than 
creating customer value. 
We directly encountered this question in our 
recent work on mobile money. We know of 
several instances where funders have tried to 
kickstart the sector by giving a large grant to 
one leading mobile money player but not to 
its competitors. Is this the right thing to do? 
Does it distort the market and prevent robust 
competition? Are there better ways to use 
subsidy—such as funding multiple players or 
investing in sector-wide infrastructure? We 
have ongoing internal debates on this topic. 
2. Limited Direct Scale:  
Only highly profitable businesses, it is argued, 
will ultimately generate the cash flow and 
raise the capital necessary to scale up and 
have massive direct social impact. Low (or 
no) profit businesses may also be unable to 
attract the talent required to innovate and 
grow. Subsidizing a business with no pros-
pects of operating at scale is therefore simply 
an inefficient use of capital.
3. Compromising the Promise of the  
 Impact Investing Industry:
Impact investing will succeed only if investors 
are able to demonstrate strong investment 
acumen and the ability to work constructively 
with entrepreneurs to grow strongly profit-
able, scalable businesses. If impact investing 
becomes the domain of low financial and low 
scale expectations, many may question the 
fundamental impact investing premise that 
businesses generating social impact also can 
earn strong returns.
The Positive Uses of Firm Subsidy
Of course, there are also circumstances in 
which the potential benefits of directly subsi-
dizing a for-profit business may outweigh the 
risks. The following are counter-arguments to 
the risks described above:
1. Spurring Market Development
It is all fine and well to complain that subsi-
dies may distort markets, but what if there is 
no market to distort? In some cases, subsidies 
are going to firms that are trying to create 
an entire new market and are willing to take 
risks that no other entity is willing to take. In 
general, the more disadvantaged the popula-
tion being served, the lower the prospects 
for profitability and the lower the risk that a 
subsidy will be market distorting.   
2. Catalyzing Other Models of Scale:
While tapping commercial capital markets 
may make it easier for firms to scale and 
directly touch millions of customers, it is not 
the only way for for-profit organizations to 
We would also point out that the 
appropriateness of subsidy is 
strongly influenced by the  
nature of the market being served: 
subsidies may be necessary to 
kick-start firms serving the very 
base of the economic pyramid, 
but are less essential—and poten-
tially harmful—when directed at 
firms serving those with significant 
disposable income.
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contribute to impact at scale. As noted in the 
previous blog post, some firms will have their 
biggest impact by contributing to indirect 
scale. These firms can pioneer an innovative 
model that will be improved by subsequent 
actors who may indeed be able to generate 
strong returns. There are also firms that gen-
erate a low return but provide critical industry 
infrastructure. Investors who consider both 
sector value creation AND firm value creation, 
may find it catalytic to invest in these kinds of 
businesses.  
Additionally, it is important to note that dif-
ferent firms have different capital require-
ments. Some “low-capital-intensive” firms, 
particularly those that make use of technolo-
gies such as the Internet and mobile, can 
scale on their own without having to tap 
commercial capital markets.  
3. Creating Pipeline for the Impact  
 Investing Industry
It’s worth noting that many of the firms hav-
ing the biggest impact on disadvantaged 
populations have indeed benefitted from 
some form of subsidy. According to the 
Monitor group, most of the businesses serv-
ing the base of the pyramid in India benefit-
ted from subsidy in their early years. M-Pesa, 
the widely recognized innovator in mobile 
payments, was launched with a grant from 
DFID, the UK development agency. And 
microfinance, which remains the single most 
prominent example of a high social impact 
sector serving primarily the poor, benefitted 
from more than a billion dollars of subsidy 
before reaching commercial viability. In sum, 
in certain markets, there may be no chance of 
making impact investing a high returns busi-
ness without first using subsidies to prime the 
innovation pump.
We would not rule out the possibility of a 
fourth scenario in which a socially impactful 
industry sector has a steady state in which 
there are medium returns and high impact. 
This, too, remains a subject for internal de-
bate and perhaps fodder for a future blog 
post.
First, Do No Harm
At Omidyar Network, our ability to deploy all 
types of capital, from grants to commercial 
investment capital—and everything in be-
tween—has caused us to think carefully about 
what type of capital to use in which situa-
tions. We are reticent to invest in low returns 
businesses, lest that lead us down the path 
toward limited scale, sloppy investing, di-
minished expectations, and potential market 
distortion. Nevertheless, we do feel that there 
are instances when it is worthwhile to invest 
in a business even though it may be unlikely 
to generate a strong financial return. There 
really is no simplistic “yes” or “no” answer, 
but rather a complicated and nuanced set 
of conditions under which different types of 
investments can play a complementary role in 
sparking sectors. We think the impact invest-
ing sector would be well served if it moved 
beyond the simple “is subsidy good or bad” 
formulation and toward a more nuanced, 
inclusive and ultimately more impactful ap-
proach.
Generally speaking, the biggest determinants 
of whether we will consider below market 
returns tends to be the income level and size 
of the market that the entrepreneur is trying 
to serve. For example, in 2008, we made a 
concessionary equity investment in BRAC to 
deliver microfinance services in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone because they were serving a 
small, extremely poor, war-torn population. 
(We also gave a grant to their sister NGO 
that gives livelihood training to poor rural 
women to enable them to take advantage of 
the small loans they receive.) Not surprisingly, 
organizations providing goods or services 
Generally speaking, the big-
gest determinants of whether 
we will consider below market 
returns tends to be the income 
level and size of the market 
that the entrepreneur is trying 
to serve. 
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to the extreme poor are much more likely to 
require subsidy than those serving the next 
level up. 
Market distortion tends to be a bigger risk in 
large markets, with multiple players, serving 
relatively affluent populations. We find that 
impact investors can sometimes lump the 
vast majority of developing world customers 
into a very broad definition of “base of the 
pyramid” without appreciating the vast differ-
ences in disposable income and purchasing 
habits across segments. (There is an excellent 
overview of segmenting the BOP by Harvard 
Business School Professor Michael Chu.)  
In sum, we believe that impact investors 
should adopt a “do no harm” credo with 
respect to the use of subsidies. Before subsi-
dizing a for-profit firm with grants or conces-
sional debt or equity, impact investors should 
ask themselves several questions:
1. Am I slanting the competitive playing field 
by favoring one firm over another? Even 
if there is only one incumbent, will a large 
grant dissuade others from entering the 
market? 
2. If I do not expect market rates of return 
on my investment, do I believe that this 
firm can meet at least one of the following 
conditions:  
a. Scale on its own or with additional 
grant funding without needing follow-
on rounds of commercial financing; 
b. Eventually refine its business model, so 
that it can tap commercial capital down 
the road; 
c. Create a significant demonstration ef-
fect, thereby advancing or even catalyz-
ing an entire sector; 
d. Provide an important public good for 
the industry as a whole. 
In sum, we believe that impact 
investors should adopt a “do no 
harm” credo with respect to the 
use of subsidies
Innovative firms, whether supported by 
subsidy or not, play a central role in spark-
ing entire new sectors for social change. But 
they do not always control their own destiny. 
Of course, government and politics have 
a critical role to play. A firm can win in the 
marketplace and still fail if it does not care-
fully consider the impact that it has—not 
only on its customers but also on entrenched 
economic interests and on the politicians who 
consider themselves to be advocates of the 
disadvantaged. And government also can 
play a hugely catalytic effect in creating en-
tire new sectors. We turn to this issue in the 
next section.
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Government Matters
V.
To date, much of the discussion about policy 
for impact investing has been about specific 
tools, such as special purpose legal vehicles 
(e.g., the benefit corporation), or tax incen-
tives for investors. While this is important, 
we would suggest there is a more urgent 
need—to align interests between those who 
are trying to serve disadvantaged popula-
tions from a business perspective and those 
in government who feel they represent the 
disadvantaged. 
Political Risk and Vulnerability
The microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh 
and the No Pay movement in Nicaragua were 
not random anomalies. Explosive questions 
about appropriate pricing and quality of ser-
vice are central to all for-profit efforts serv-
ing the disadvantaged. So, too, are questions 
about political interests, threatened incum-
bent players, and colliding ideologies.
Impact investors cannot afford to ignore 
critical political considerations. Enlightened 
politicians and policymakers have the poten-
tial to dramatically speed up the rate at by 
which an industry can scale to responsibly 
serve hundreds of millions. Conversely, when 
impact investors fail to align with policymak-
ers, we will find ourselves at risk of double 
jeopardy. We can fail because the companies 
we invest in may have a hard time growing 
in the most challenging of markets. Or we 
can fail because these same companies may 
eventually be seen as too successful and 
profitable—inviting a powerful and potentially 
destructive backlash from public opinion, 
threatened incumbent commercial interests 
and/or politicians.       
The Role of Government
Governments have numerous powerful levers 
at their disposal to accelerate new industries 
for impact. Among the most important policy 
imperatives are: ensuring fair and robust 
competition; establishing appropriate regula-
tion; and promoting entrepreneurship.
1.  Ensuring Robust Competition
In both India and Mexico, a significant per-
centage of the population lives in poverty. 
And in both countries, poor people use mo-
bile phones for everything from banking ser-
vices to getting health advice when they’re 
too far from a hospital. But whereas in India, 
the typical mobile phone user pays less than 
a cent per minute of airtime, in Mexico, this 
same service costs 27 cents per minute. Why 
this difference? 
In the late 1990s, the Indian government 
deliberately adopted policies (including a 
major decrease in licensing fees) to move the 
mobile market from a duopoly to a market in 
which 14 major players actively compete. As 
a result, prices have dropped and demand 
widened—leading to far greater inclusion of 
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the disenfranchised. In Mexico, meanwhile, 
Telcel controls about 70 percent of the mo-
bile telephony market and has been able to 
successfully maintain a situation of limited 
competition. According to a January 2012 
OECD report, Mexican consumers are being 
over-charged by $US 13.4 billion a year for 
phone and Internet services. Monopolistic or 
oligopolistic players not only charge higher 
rates, of course, they also tend to hinder in-
novation.
The importance of competition is also un-
derscored by the experience in microfinance.  
Intense competition—rather than interest rate 
caps or government fiat—has been one of the 
single most important drivers of declining in-
terest rates and improving customer service, 
according to a 2006 CGAP study.  
2.  Establishing Appropriate Regulation
Policymakers must be proactive in ensur-
ing appropriate consumer protections for 
the poor and disadvantaged consumers. But 
they have a wider variety of tools to do so 
than one might frequently assume. In micro-
finance, for example, successful countries like 
Bolivia and Peru have strict regulations to 
ensure the financial solvency and responsible 
credit underwriting methodologies of lend-
ing institutions. But regulation should not be 
overly onerous and should encourage innova-
tion rather than protect incumbent players. 
Significantly, many countries permitted MFIs 
to provide savings as well as credit products, 
allowing MFIs to serve customers better, even 
while diversifying their revenue base and 
reducing reliance on interest-charging credit 
products. Many industry observers note that 
the Indian governments refusal to allow MFIs 
to accept deposits contributed to the MFIs 
obsession with rapid credit expansion and cli-
ent over-indebtedness, which were contribut-
ing factors to the crisis in Andhra Pradesh. 
Mobile payments is another sector in which 
government policy can either accelerate or 
hinder market development. When consider-
ing the enormous utility and growth potential 
of mobile payments, most governments have 
legitimate concerns about money launder-
ing and less high-minded concerns about 
the business risks that such innovations pose 
for the frequently coddled banking sec-
tor. In Kenya, the government has worked 
with M-Pesa, the popular mobile payments 
provider, to establish limits on the size of 
money transfers, thereby substantially reduc-
ing money laundering risk. M-Pesa has been 
an enormous success, and now serves more 
than 70 percent of Kenyan adults and handles 
the equivalent of 25 percent of Kenyan GDP. 
Unfortunately, mobile payments has been 
far less successful in many countries where 
vested interests are stronger. In too many 
countries, regulators have taken a much more 
restrictive approach and been less resourceful 
in developing appropriate solutions to enable 
the safe and reliable mobile money transfers. 
3.  Promoting Entrepreneurship
New sectors are only as good as the entre-
preneurs and teams that develop innovative 
products and services. There’s a lot that gov-
ernments can do to ensure the quality and 
vibrancy of entrepreneurial activity. 
Rwanda, for example, has achieved an im-
pressive 8.4 percent growth rate over the 
past decade. Part of this is due to reforms 
initiated by President Kagami that have made 
it easier to start businesses, register property, 
protect investors, and access credit. Ka-
gami’s approach was bottom-up rather than 
top-down; he saw entrepreneurs as directly 
responsible for building the economy, and 
devised policies to get out of their way. He 
also promoted specific sectors and facilitated 
the creation of relevant infrastructure to help 
them scale.  
Impact investors cannot afford  
to ignore critical political  
considerations. Enlightened  
politicians and policymakers 
have the potential to dramatically 
speed up the rate at by which an 
industry can scale to responsibly 
serve hundreds of millions. 
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With a similar philosophy, Omidyar Network 
recently worked with the Government of India 
on a series of recommendations to build the 
country’s entrepreneurial ecosystem. The 
recently released report highlights a vari-
ety of proactive steps the government can 
take—including scaling up venture incubation 
facilities, as well as providing appropriate 
regulations around capital gains to encour-
age easier exits for angel and early-stage 
investors. An excellent overview on the ways 
in which government can help drive a more 
entrepreneurial environment is available here.
Philanthropists and not-for-profits also play 
a critical role in creating more vibrant entre-
preneurial ecosystems. Endeavor, a global 
not-for-profit headquartered in New York 
City, for example, seeks to catalyze long term 
economic growth by selecting, mentoring, 
and accelerating high impact entrepreneurs in 
13 countries around the world. Among other 
things, Endeavor is cultivating the creation of 
a powerful network of entrepreneurs: entre-
preneurs who are not only successful in their 
own right, but entrepreneurs who—through 
collaboration, mentoring, and investing—
are creating a network and an ecosystem 
that can have a massive multiplier effect on 
country-level innovation. Indeed, Endeavor’s 
experience suggests that a robust network 
of entrepreneurs and mentors can overcome 
even challenging macroeconomic and policy 
environments. Endeavor’s work in fostering 
an entrepreneurial network in Argentina has 
been particularly impressive, as highlighted in 
this short video.
Politics and policy are but two factors that 
fundamentally shape the trajectory of new 
sectors. Ultimately, success is best achieved 
when supportive politicians and policies are 
married with entrepreneurs and a diverse set 
of investors who are deeply committed to 
innovation and sector level change. Getting 
this formula right can mean the difference 
between impacting hundreds and hundreds 
of millions of lives. In the our next and final 
section , we turn to the question of what is 
at stake at the critical junctures of market 
development: how do markets actually scale 
and what are the points at which entrepre-
neurship, different kinds of capital, and policy 
come together to a make meaningful differ-
ence in the lives of millions of people.  
Impact investors cannot afford  
to ignore critical political  
considerations. Enlightened  
politicians and policymakers 
have the potential to dramatically 
speed up the rate at by which an 
industry can scale to responsibly 
serve hundreds of millions. 
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Achieving Take-Off
VI.
It is telling that so many in the impact invest-
ing sector—including us in this discussion 
paper —consistently fall back on microfinance 
as the example of successful impact invest-
ing for the disadvantaged. Microfinance, 
despite recent controversy and misgivings, 
has indeed reached massive scale—an esti-
mated 200 million people. But microfinance 
took three decades to attain this scale, and it 
still reaches a modest percentage of those in 
need.
The contrast to mobile telephony—a purely 
commercial innovation that has fundamental-
ly improved the lives of the poor—is dramatic. 
Although the first commercial mobile cellular 
services were established in 1978 (around the 
time of the emergence of microfinance), the 
number of mobile accounts in the develop-
ing world soared from less than five percent 
of the population in 2000 to more than 70 
percent (more than 4.5 billion people) today. 
Although the dynamics and challenges of 
microfinance and mobile telephony are quite 
different, we must ask ourselves how we can 
create more innovations that achieve the kind 
of breadth and rapid expansion that mobile 
telephony experienced. 
In this paper, we’ve argued that it is both 
possible, and urgently necessary, for impact 
investors to head in this direction. But suc-
cess will require a shift from current practice. 
Instead of cherry-picking investments in indi-
vidual enterprises that will yield high return 
and high social impact, we need to commit to 
“priming the pump” to encourage the growth 
of new industry sectors. We’ll need to take 
more diverse risks (not just traditional firm-
level business risks, but sector risks), and 
deploy a variety of capital types (from grants 
to a variety of high-risk for-profit invest-
ments)—to get early-stage innovators off the 
ground, and support the infrastructure that 
accelerates their success. This will also fre-
quently require deploying political and policy 
capital—types of capital not often discussed 
in the impact investing arena. In order to pro-
mote the delivery of high quality products at 
reasonable prices, policymakers may need to 
confront vested interests to promote com-
petitive markets that protect the interests of 
consumers.  
We conclude this discussion paper by illus-
trating why these actions are of such great 
importance to billions of people. 
Altering the S-Curve
For years, analysts of commercial markets 
have used the so-called “S-curve” to describe 
the adoption of a new innovation across a so-
ciety over time—from early adoption, through 
rapid growth and to maturity. Typically, the 
adoption of a new innovation happens slowly 
in the initial phases, then increases rapidly for 
a number of years before beginning to slow 
down to where a product reaches what ap-
pears to be a long-term saturation point. 
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The S-curve shows us in stark terms how 
seemingly small changes can dramatically 
impact millions of lives. Bringing forward the 
year of “take-off point or accelerating the 
rate of adoption, even by a small amount, 
can yield extraordinary leverage in terms of 
the number of lives impacted. These kinds of 
interventions can make an exceptional dif-
ference in the developing world, where very 
few market ecosystems develop rapidly and 
seamlessly.  
 
The bottom curve in the chart above—with 
limited scale and very slow adoption of a new 
product—unfortunately represents the status 
quo for most sectors serving the disadvan-
taged. We have far too many examples of 
sectors captured by one or two monopolistic 
players that prevent further growth and in-
novation. In many slums, for example, water 
is provided by local gang lords, who will 
prevent anyone else from supplying water or 
demand graft in exchange for market access. 
The same situation holds for moneylenders 
that operate in remote villages where banks 
are absent. Such situations tragically force 
poor customers to pay high prices for low-
quality products, limiting their choices and, 
ultimately, their economic mobility.
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But success will require a shift 
from current practice. Instead of 
cherry-picking investments in  
individual enterprises that will 
yield high return and high social 
impact, we need to commit to  
“priming the pump” to encourage 
the growth of new industry  
sectors
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Emerging Sectors 
Luckily, the picture is not entirely bleak. We 
are beginning to see the emergence of sec-
tors that have a strong chance of beating the 
typical “lazy S-curve. The solar lighting sec-
tor is one robust contender. Starting around 
2007, early stage impact investors helped 
companies like d.light test production of low-
cost, environmentally friendly lighting that 
could serve the 1.4 billion poor people cur-
rently without access to grid electricity. Over 
time, a number of competitors have entered 
the field, driving prices down to below the 
dollars for simple lanterns and increasing the 
quality and diversity of products offered. The 
growth of the solar lighting sector has in turn 
created secondary ecosystems, further help-
ing to accelerate the market. A new crop of 
companies like M-KOPA and Eight19 have de-
veloped creative financing schemes enabling 
poor customers to afford lanterns by spread-
ing out the schedule of payments. 
Industry-specific government policy has 
played a huge role for the solar home prod-
ucts—both for good and ill. In places like In-
dia, solar lantern producers have had a harder 
time competing because of government sub-
sidies for kerosene—a well-intentioned policy 
that unfortunately keeps the poor dependent 
on an environmentally hazardous and less 
efficient energy source. By contrast, in Ban-
gladesh, the government has greatly acceler-
ated the market for home solar systems by 
providing supportive financing terms. These 
financing plans have helped some 750,000 
remote households and shops to access a 
suite of solar products that enable children to 
study at night and businesses to extend their 
hours past dark. Over 30,000 solar home sys-
tems are being installed every month in rural 
Bangladesh. 
We also see great promise in the afford-
able private education sector. In the early 
days, commercial investors were skeptical 
that private schools could deliver afford-
able, high quality education to poor people 
in Kenya. But Bridge Academies has tested 
and refined a highly innovative “school in a 
box” model, delivering high quality instruc-
tion, and expanding to nearly 82 locations. In 
the process, they’ve started to receive atten-
tion from serious commercial investors. Not 
only will Bridge itself likely be able to expand 
operations to neighboring East African coun-
tries—we also expect copycat businesses to 
emerge, thus further accelerating the growth 
of the sector and delivering vastly improved 
educational opportunities to millions of chil-
dren.
As previously mentioned, the success of 
Kenya’s MPesa mobile payment system, also 
portends an exciting new future for mobile 
payments. The success of mobile payments 
would not only create more efficient, safe and 
affordable payments for millions. It would 
also foster additional new sectors in related 
mobile services and mobile commerce, thus 
further enhancing opportunity and spawning 
economic growth.  
Success for critical industry sectors is far 
from guaranteed. Any number of potential 
pitfalls—from political sensitivities to market-
ing challenges to local economic shocks—
could slow down or halt the rate of growth. 
And even if these sectors are successful, we’ll 
be faced with a number of new and challeng-
ing questions. For example, having developed 
an innovative model of affordable education 
for the poor, should firms such as Bridge 
open-source their learning to encourage rep-
lication, or is it preferable keep trade secrets 
in order to maintain competitive advantage? 
How does corporate ownership and gover-
nance shape a firm’s focus on critical issues 
such as an adherence to a social mission? 
Does a firm even need an explicit social mis-
sion to have positive social impact? How do 
answers to these questions evolve when firms 
begin to tap commercial capital markets?
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We do not pretend to have all the answers. 
We simply know that even small steps in the 
direction of bending the S-curve can alter 
the lives of millions. If we had worked ear-
lier with policymakers in Andhra Pradesh to 
ensure healthy competition and reasonable 
consumer protection, millions more people 
would now have access to financial services 
in India. Or recall our earlier examples about 
medical technology for the base of the pyra-
mid in India. Accelerating the point of takeoff 
for medical device industries by three to four 
years would mean an additional two billion 
treatments per year for the poor—which 
could mean the difference between life and 
death for many
The impact investing sector, while still in its 
infancy, has made remarkable progress in 
building awareness that business can gener-
ate a positive social impact. Although indi-
vidual firms remain the essential innovators 
and building blocks of social change, they are 
means to a broader end of creating innova-
tions that can touch the lives of hundreds of 
millions. It is time now to evolve the conver-
sation, and our resource commitments in the 
direction of sparking, nurturing, and scaling 
these new industry sectors that are the true 
promise of the impact investing industry. 
What is readily apparent to us is that no one 
organization, or one type of organization, can 
do this alone. Success does not depend upon 
perfect coordination or a grand plan. After all, 
we are talking about innovation, which re-
quires experimentation, learning, and seren-
dipity. But success does require a determined, 
thoughtful, and frequently collaborative 
effort by those who believe that the power of 
markets and the inspiration of entrepreneurs 
can be tapped to create opportunity and a 
brighter future for billions. 
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improve their lives. Established in 2004 by eBay founder Pierre Omidyar 
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organizations to catalyze economic and social change. To date, Omidyar 
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